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Abstract 
 
In recent years, the leading Japanese wireless operator NTT DoCoMo has risen from 
being largely unknown outside Japan to international fame. Ground-breaking service 
innovations such as the world’s first wireless internet service, I-mode, the world’s 
first third generation wireless service FOMA, as well as the company’s successful 
proliferation of its W-CDMA 3G technologies as the UMTS standard in Europe have 
generally impressed the troubled telecom industry on its brink to the new era wireless 
data services. Conversely, much scientism has been aired whether the NTT DoCoMo 
experience applies to European and US contexts due to differences in e.g. 
demographics, Internet penetration, and wireless industry structures. To date, these 
considerations have largely been based on anecdotal reports in trade magazines and an 
increasing number of case studies focused primarily on the I-mode service (e.g. 
Mulder and Simpson (2001); Harvard (2000)). Notable, exceptions are Ratliff (2001) 
and Williamson and Meegan (2002) that however both point to the need for elevating 
insights on NTT DoCoMo. This working paper sets out to contribute to a more 
elaborate picture of NTT DoCoMo. 
 
The working paper is outlined as follows. Departing from a sketch of DoCoMo’s 
current challenges from the perspective of the CEO Keiji Tachikawa as the financial 
year 2003 is coming to an end (March 31 2003), a brief introduction to DoCoMo’s 
history and its innovative capabilities initiates the effort to present a more detailed 
picture of the company. Then, the normal perception of NTT DoCoMo as a de facto 
monopolist with all dominating market and bargaining power is challenged by means 
of longitudinal study of the Japanese wireless market’s development from 1992 to 
2003. During this period, DoCoMo’s leadership position as increasingly been 
challenged by new competitors that emerged from an industry consolidation and 
regulatory forces. It is found that the nature of competition has shifted from 
DoCoMo’s undisputed dominance to a more dynamic environment signified by 
intense service innovation based competition. Then, insights are provided as how the 
NTT DoCoMo competes in its new environment. Three key strategic pillars are 
analyzed, namely the company’s to approaches the (1) orchestrating of innovation 
with the examples of I-mode, C-mode, and Telematics services, (2) relational 
challenges with the examples of technology standardization alliances, interfirm 
relationships with handset providers and internationalization partners, and lastly (3) 
how new growth avenues are explored. 
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In the air 
 
On his return from London in mid-January 2003, Keiji Tachikawa, CEO of Japan’s 
leading wireless operator NTT DoCoMo, had time to reflect on his company´s 
spectacular journey over the past decade from largely unknown Japanese wireless 
monopoly to globally celebrated wireless technology and market leader. DoCoMo had 
first caught the worlds attention with its world-first and highly successful wireless 
Internet service dubbed I-mode launched in February 1999, then later with the also 
world-first but to-date less successful FOMA 3G wireless service launched in October 
2001, and its global crusade to spread its wireless services, handsets and network 
technologies in Asia, Europe and US through minority equity investments in overseas 
wireless operators since 1999.  
 
Looking at a perfectly blue and cloudless sky from his seat, Tachikawa recalled the 
exciting times of the 1990s and the early 2000s in which his company was among the 
world’s fastest growing companies. Impressive yearly growth rates propelled annual 
revenues from ¥807 billion in 1995 to ¥5.171 billion in 2002. In the same period, the 
subscriber base had rocketed from 2,2 million to 43 million meaning that the company 
commanded nearly 60% of the worlds second largest wireless market. By 2002, the 
company’s success had made it the largest by market capitalization value in Japan, 
and among wireless operators globally (Business Week, 15.07.2002). In 2001, the 
Economist ranked the company number 9 among the world’s 5.000 largest quoted 
companies by accumulated shareholder value generated between June 1996 and June 
2001. DoCoMo was the best performing telecommunication operator worldwide 
(Economist, December 2001). A final testimony of his company’s achievements was 
its lead in the service innovation race to substitute falling earnings on voice calls with 
new revenue sources from wireless data services such as Internet, Email, M-
commerce and Multimedia. By end of 2002, DoCoMo generated 20% of revenues 
from wireless data, while global competitor Vodaphone’s share of data ARPU 
amounted to 16% (Appendix; Vodaphone, 2003). 
 
As the sleek private jet entered a thundercloud, the turbulence brought Tachikawa 
back to his company’s challenges of present times. Recently, DoCoMo had faced 
increasing problems both due to intensified competition in the Japanese home-market, 
a widening revenue gab caused by early saturation of its 2G services and a 
surprisingly slow uptake of its 3G services, and substantial losses on overseas 
investments. The last financial year ended in March 2002 had broken the company’s 
steady profit growth due to substantial write-offs on equity investments in Asian, 
European and US wireless operators caused by partners´ falling share prices due to the 
burst of the telecom share bubble. Since, more write-offs had followed leading to 
accumulated losses of Y1,489bn of the totally Y1,800bn invested overseas. In Japan, 
the successor to I-mode that with currently 36 million I-mode subscribers had been 
the key driver of the company’s growth since the launch in February 1999, 3G FOMA 
had witnessed nearly disastrously slow uptake. Meanwhile, for instance, competitor 
KDDI had surpassed DoCoMo with their attractive and successful camera-phones and 
thereby threatened DoCoMo’s unbroken lead in service innovations.  
 
Soon, the financial year 2003 would come to an end. By March 2003, the company at 
best would have solid proof to shareholders and industry observers that the 
tremendous success of I-mode had not merely been one-time luck. Indeed, during 
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2002, the ambitious international expansion plans had materialized through a series of 
commercial launches of I-mode on new 2,5G networks in Europe and Asia, however 
with limited success so far. Also, substantial efforts had been made to match and 
outpace Japanese competitors in launching new innovative wireless services and 
handsets. The big question remained, if DoCoMo was on the right strategic track for 
the current and future challenges in the rapidly changing and increasingly competitive 
wireless industry. Surely, by mid-March shareholders would ask him that question.  
 
The London-visit he was returning from had included a friendly visit to the premises 
of newly established European HQ, but also a rare public interview with the Financial 
Times. At the interview, he had indicated that his Company expected substantial 
consolidation in the European market resulting in four major regional players. He had 
also defended his strategy of taking minority investments in overseas operators rather 
than e.g. entering markets through acquisition like Vodaphone. In Europe, the key 
partner, Dutch KPN Mobile, against expectations based on recent financial trouble 
would not emerge one of the four key players. "That is why we are being friendly 
with Telefonica (of Spain) and we have been friendly with TIM (Telecom Italia 
Mobile) for many years, Tachikawa said (Financial Times, January 2003a). But would 
those answers satisfy shareholders, and even more importantly secure the continuous 
growth of DoCoMo?  
 
Introduction to NTT DoCoMo 
 
As the leading wireless operator in the Japanese home market, NTT DoCoMo 
captures around 60% of the world’s 2nd largest wireless market – a market that was 
largely developed by the company itself during the 1990s. Telecommunications has 
traditionally been focused on transmitting voice calls, but following a global trend, 
revenues from traditional person-to-person voice services have been steadily declining 
since the mid-1990s. Highly successfully, the company has responded to this key 
challenge of Global Wireless Industry by developing and commercializing new 
wireless data services to generate new revenue sources.  
 
NTT DoCoMo’s core business remains the provision of wireless voice and data 
services through attractive operator-specific handsets retailed by NTT DoCoMo to 
subscribers. To do so, the company co-develops, builds, operates and owns a wireless 
infrastructure transmitting the voice and data signals. Traditionally, revenues are 
earned on time-based tariffs charged for voice calls. In the case of wireless data 
services tariffs are charged on the amount of data packets transmitted when 
subscribers e.g. surf the wireless internet or receive wireless emails, as well as shared 
revenues from the service fees collected by content providers for access wireless 
internet services such as ringing tones, entertainment, news and more. Thus, 
fundamentally, DoCoMo make revenue by offering attractive wireless services or 
providing access to attractive wireless Internet content that generate chargeable 
network traffic. Facing declining voice revenues, the company in line with global 
peers is eagerly developing new revenue sources in the emerging era of wireless data. 
Thus, revenues are increasingly earned on e.g. revenue sharing with wireless content 
providers, advertisements on the wireless Internet, profits and equity gains from 
overseas market alliances, and service application alliances. Moreover, revenues are 
earned from royalties and licenses on the company’s technology base.  
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Company history 
 
The prior wireless arm of the formerly state-owned Japanese telecommunication 
monopoly, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT), was spun-off in 
April 1992. The split-up was driven by the liberalization and privatization of the 
Japanese telecommunication sector, and throughout the 1990s regulators continued to 
lower protection from national and later international competitors to the benefit of 
consumers. While parent NTT has remained in the seat as majority owner with 
currently 64,1% of outstanding shares, the October 1998 IPO in Tokyo, further 
listings at NYSE and LSE in March 2002, and a series of corporate bond issues have 
increased exposure to and fundraising from the international financial markets. 
 
The company’s first CEO (1992-1998), Kouji Oshboshi, provided the leadership 
necessary to develop the wireless market in Japan since 1992. In 1997, he predicted 
that growth generated on wireless voice services would saturate in the near future. 
This promptly motivated the establishment of the Gateway Business Department led 
by another key executive and electrical engineer, Keiichi Enoki, with the task to 
develop non-voice (i.e. data) wireless services (Kodama, 2001). Enoki soon built a 
talented engineering team. Among the key innovators in the team were seasoned 
manager and outside talent Mrs. Matsunaga, and the Internet entrepreneur, Takeshi 
Natsuno. Key to the development of the I-mode service was that the team worked 
around a business model inspired by AOL’s platform approach in USA rather than a 
technology, and moreover entirely built the wireless service on existing technologies 
to minimize time to market (Business Week, 17.01.2000; Mulder and Simpson, 2001; 
Kodama, 2001). In 1998, Keiji Tachikawa became CEO (and still is), and contributed 
in the commercialization stage of I-mode by e.g. insisting on affordable pricing and 
simple and intuitive functionality to ensure widespread adoption of I-mode (Business 
Week, 17.01.2000). Under Tachikawa, DoCoMo’s management has sustained its 
recognition among industry observers as visionary and innovative, and moreover 
accelerated the internationalization process of the company that today is among the 
cores of the competitive strategy (Credit Swiss First Boston, September 2000; Boston 
Consulting Group, 2002). 
 
DoCoMo’s innovative capabilities 
 
Looking back on the past 3 years, Keiji Tachikawa was puzzled with the kind of 
attention paid to his Company. DoCoMo had gone from being largely unknown 
outside Japan to be globally celebrated for its innovative I-mode wireless Internet and 
the daring worldwide first launch of 3G services. At the same time, however, overseas 
skeptics claimed European and US players could learn little from DoCoMo, as its 
success had more to do with young Japanese gadget freaks and a protected market 
position than DoCoMo itself. In consequence, considering the efforts of western firms 
to learn TQM from Toyota during the 1980s, surprisingly little consideration had been 
made about the factors underlying the DoCoMo’s success. In his opinion, however, 
DoCoMo’s success is very much based on its strong innovative capabilities held both 
internally and externally. 
 
Strong R&D in wireless technologies, infrastructure and handsets 
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Wireless operators typically focus solely on network operations and rely on 
equipment and handset vendors for R&D. In comparison, DoCoMo has a strong R&D 
tradition for both basic and applied R&D in wireless technologies, which was a key 
inheritance from NTT. After the Second World War, the parent company was created 
by the Japanese state as a monopoly to provide telecommunication services to 
stimulate the national economy and to facilitate other high-tech industries through 
huge R&D and procurement budgets. The objective was to nurture and support a 
strong family of firms to domesticate foreign technology and ensure independency. 
The ‘NTT family’ included ‘the big four’ (NEC, Fujitsu, Oki and Hitachi) and a 
couple of hundred smaller firms. The keiretsu-style environment was highly 
collaborative rather than competitive, and NTT co-funded and participated in the 
development of new equipment and products that were subsequently procured from 
family members (Anchordoguy, 2001; Business Week, January 2000). 
 
Today, a state-of-the-art R&D organization with above 900 researchers keeps up 
brutal pace of innovation, and is headquartered in the Yokosuka Research Park 
(YRP), southwest of Tokyo. Here, Japanese and overseas handset and equipment 
vendors flock to learn from and collaborate with one of the global wireless technology 
leaders. Also, Western journalists and companies frequently visit the premises to get a 
taste of future wireless telecommunications. The organization covers all R&D stages 
ranging from basic research, and applied research often conducted with technology 
alliance partners, to prototyping and testing through trials of novel technology 
systems, and finally refinements of existing equipment through operations and 
maintenance (NTT DoCoMo Annual Report, 2001). 
 
During the 1990s, the Company’s proprietary 2G PDC wireless technology dominated 
the Japanese market, and the high quality of the network ensured unchallenged 
technological leadership until mid-1998. It was developed solely through the NTT 
family and intended for later export to EU and US markets. Regional standardization 
processes, however, resulted in EU adopting GSM and the US having enough 
competing standards already, which postponed the internationalization of DoCoMo. 
Still, due to its packet-switched communication mode, the PDC network became key 
to the development of the I-mode Internet service because it enabled the I-mode 
creators to build the innovative platform business model with its always-on feature, 
and simple billing system based on revenue-sharing for wireless data services. Hence, 
the network enabled the launch of the worldwide first wireless Internet service in 
1999 at low investment costs (Funk and Methe, 2001; Credit Swiss First Boston, 
September 2000; Ratliff, 2002). 
 
The commercial launch of the 3G FOMA wireless service in September 2001 was the 
culmination of 10 years innovation efforts. Basic research commenced in the early 
1990s, collaborative applied R&D for building and testing experimental network 
systems was pursued in late 1990s and the network rollout was initiated in 1999 (NTT 
DoCoMo press releases, Nakajima and Yamao, 2001). The WCDMA technology 
provides a 10-fold performance increase compared to 2G technologies (i.e. 384 kbps 
downlink and 64 kbps uplink transfer speeds). Based on lessons learned from PDC, 
DoCoMo has very actively proliferated the technology as the 3G world standard 
through standardization forums, technology alliances with equipment vendors and 
handset producers, and market alliances with overseas wireless operators. W-CDMA 
was adopted by the European standardization body ESTI in 1997 as the European 3G 
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standard (UMTS), and numerous Asian countries have also adopted the standard. 
Currently, around 110 wireless operators have adopted the standard, which puts it 
ahead of the main competing standard, US-based CDMA2000 1x (NTT DoCoMo 
Press release, 06.11.2002). 
 
In Europe and US, most wireless operators are struggling with high debts from 3G 
licenses and investments in intermediate network updates for wireless data with e.g. 
GPRS and in 3G infrastructure. Ahead of its time, DoCoMo is preparing for 4G 
wireless telecommunications based on a R&D programme started in April 1998 (NTT 
DoCoMo Press release, 05.04.2000; NTT DoCoMo Annual report, 2001). During 
2002, OFDMA was chosen as the company’s 4G standard, and successful 
transmission at 100Mbps-downlink and 20Mbps-uplink speeds on a 4G experimental 
system during fall 2002 indicates the advanced stage of the company’s research. 
Whereas WCDMA was not compatible with PDC meaning high investments in 
rolling out a new network for 3G, OFDMA is designed to be compatible with 
WCDMA allowing cheaper gradual updates of existing 3G networks in the future 
(Nakajima and Yamao, 2001; NTT DoCoMo Press releases). 
  
Following the tradition of NTT, DoCoMo has continued to do joint R&D with 
wireless infrastructure and handset vendors in ‘the NTT family’ and in particular NEC 
and Fujitsu. However, since mid-1990s the family has been extended internationally. 
Now, key infrastructure vendors are NEC, Ericsson and Lucent, and key handset 
vendors include all major Asian, European and US vendors. 
 
Superior technology commercialization and marketing skills 
 
NTT DoCoMo is renowned for having an exceptional marketing power based on a 
customer-oriented mindset, strong brands and superior sales channels (Nomura, 1998; 
HSCB, October 2001). Customer-orientation might be expected from modern 
companies. Nonetheless, in recent years, European and American wireless operators 
have proven “notoriously bad at developing new attractive services” to consumers, 
and a key reason is often sighted to be overly emphasis on technology rather than 
customer needs as seen with the failed European WAP wireless Internet service 
(Economist, July 2002).  
 
Keiji Tachikawa had recently refused to make guestimates on future killer 
applications to succeed SMS and ringing tones, “because our customers will decide” 
(Boston Consulting Group, 2002). Instead of outguessing customer preferences, the 
Company instead relies on large-scale experimentation of multiple killer application 
candidates. To illustrate, in the case of I-mode, the company developed a technology 
platform for Internet-like content, which serves as a market place in which sellers (i.e. 
content providers) by utilizing available platform features provided by NTT DoCoMo 
such as JAVA compatibility, I-area (location-specific services), I-shot (pictures) and 
I-motion (video) can develop and offer new innovative service content to I-mode and 
FOMA subscribers. DoCoMo facilitates the market transactions with effective billing 
systems, sets quality standards for official content providers, and ensures that the total 
portfolio of content providers cover a wide range of content categories such as ringing 
tones, banking, news, restaurants and more. Over time, the actual subscriber demand 
will lead to either prosperity or failure of launched content services. Thereby, no 
matter which services prevail, DoCoMo will profit from increased network traffic 
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from the commercially successful services. Currently, I-mode gives access to 3.000 
official I-mode sites and above 54.000 voluntary sites not officially associated with 
the Company (NTT DoCoMo Annual report, 2002). 
 
The company takes a similar portfolio approach to the joint development of new types 
of wireless services with alliance partners such as Sun Microsystems, Matsushita, 
Sony, IBM, HP, Walt Disney, Sony Playstation, Sega, AOL, SAP, IBM Lotus, 
Oracle, Coca-Cola and Nissan. Now, thus, the ‘DoCoMo’ family is also crossing 
national boundaries for service development. Given the uncertainty on how the new 
wireless technology can be commercially exploited and which new wireless data 
services customers will pay for, DoCoMo engages in R&D alliances with leading 
firms from other industries such as music, movies, entertainment, banking, gaming, 
business solutions, automotive industry, formula one racing and more to leverage 
partners’ customer and market knowledge. I-mode was likewise developed in 
collaboration with Internet firms, content providers, customers and internal R&D 
staff. In these technology alliances, brainstorms produce novel applications of 
wireless technologies and market feasibility studies determine if joint development of 
new business ideas and enabling technology platforms should be pursued. After 
commercial launch, the partners share profits and property rights through consortia 
(NTT DoCoMo press releases). 
 
In Japan, the company has developed strong brand names such as DoCoMo, I-mode 
and now also FOMA. DoCoMo is a play of the Japanese for “anywhere”, and was 
initially a slogan, which due to high brand recognition was adapted as corporate name 
in the late 1990s. In Japan, the corporate mascot “DoCoMo-Chan” has long been a 
marketing phenomenon (Nomura, 1998). The 2G wireless service brand, I-mode 
stands for interactive, Internet, and independence (Fortune, September 2000). The 
FOMA wireless service, which is an abbreviation of Freedom Of Mobile multimedia 
Access, also holds a strong symbolic meaning. Backed by the commercial launches of 
I-mode in several Asian and European countries, NTT DoCoMo is becoming known 
around the world, and I-mode may soon become a global brand associated with 
superior wireless services. 
 
Strong financial resources 
 
Wireless telecommunications is a capital-intensive industry, and wireless operators 
face substantial up-front capital requirements to both upgrade existing 2G networks to 
2,5G compatibility and in particular for building novel 3G network infrastructures. In 
parallel to the increasing technological complexity, wireless networks tend to become 
increasingly expensive to operate (Davies, 1996). Also, capital expenses to 
development of new wireless data services and content are souring (Financial Times, 
May 2002). 
 
With a consistent dept/equity ratio around 30%, NTT DoCoMo is far less leveraged 
than most other wireless operators. The financial position is not only strong due to 
partial state-funding of e.g. R&D, the tremendous revenue and profit growth endured 
since 1992, and the fact that Japanese wireless operators faced no 3G license 
payments. Also, the company has raised substantial sums in the equity markets 
through the 1998 IPO, the 2002 additional listings and several bond issues before the 
window of opportunity closed to its peers in the light of the burst of the telecom 
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bubble. Also, for international expansion DoCoMo relies on equity-stakes rather than 
M&As as opposed to e.g. Vodaphone, Deutsche Telecom and French Telecom (USB 
Warburg, June 2000; NTT DoCoMo, October 2002). Thus, in 2000 and 2001 as many 
overseas peers were financially troubled, the company earned a reputation as a cash-
rich partner for the investment and commercialization of 3G wireless services. A hard 
blow to the relatively cautious investment strategy of DoCoMo was caused by falling 
share prices of its overseas investments leading to write-offs of Y1,5bn out of a total 
of Y1,8bn overseas investments. Still, at the January 2003, CEO Keiji Tachikawa had 
reassured observers that DoCoMo stays with its equity-based internationalization 
strategy. He had added that while his company was on the outlook for investment 
opportunities, now was time for patience. While he expected an European 
consolidation in the near future with the outcome of four major regional players, apart 
from Vodaphone it was unclear who would emerge as key players. (Financial Times, 
January 2003a). 
 
Wireless market development in Japan 
 
Until 1985, telecom services were the sole domain of state-owned NTT, and 
international communications were the remit of KDD, a listed company partly owned 
by NTT and an arm of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Although the 
market was technically opened and NTT was partially privatized in 1985, the 
government did little to enable effective competition beyond minor moves to open up 
long-distance and international markets (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 
1999). Four telecom segments emerged in the light of regulation; local calls within 
each of the nine regions of Japan, domestic long-distance calls between regions, 
international calls, and wireless calls (Morgan Stanley, August 1997). 
 
DoCoMo was spun-off from parent NTT in 1992, at which time liberalization of the 
wireless telecom segment remained limited, and DoCoMo still enjoyed monopoly 
market position. The wireless market itself was also limited, as NTT had only 
attracted 1 million subscribers from 1979 to 1992. Key reasons were that offered 
wireless services and handsets were still being too expensive for most households, 
analogue voice services were not compelling enough, and mobile handsets were 
heavy and unattractive to consumers. In the first years, NTT DoCoMo did not bring 
about much change to this neither and over the next two years only 1 million new 
subscribers were added. 
 
In 1994, long due liberalization paved the road for domestic competitors, and soon 
NTT DoCoMo faced competition from new domestic wireless operators such as DDI, 
IDO, JPO, Tu-Ka, and Digital Tu-Ka. Facing souring competition from the 
newcomers, NTT DoCoMo launched new tariff schemes lowering prices, and a 
handset-purchasing programme that allowed customers for the first time to buy 
handsets instead of leasing them. Over the next years the wireless market boomed as 
mobile phones and services became affordable for the masses. The 10 million mark 
was passed in early 1996 after three years consecutive 100%+ growth due to the 
continuously intense price competition and improved services. 
 
By the end of 1996, NTT DoCoMo had seen its market share erode to 52,5%. The 
biggest competitor, DDI, commanded 16,4%. The two operators were the only to 
offer nationwide wireless services, while holding different regional strongholds. The 
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rest of the booming wireless market was served by four regional operators, although 
with varying degrees of success and growth potential; JDP (9,2%), Tu-Ka (9,1%), 
IDO (8,2%), and Digital Tu-Ka (4,6%) (Morgan Stanley, August 1997; TCA, 2003). 
 
Still, the NTT DoCoMo continued to dominate the wireless market and captured most 
of the market growth despite intense price competition on tariffs and handsets. In 
particular, its competitive lead was underpinned by a supreme image on service 
quality and customer care, high customer loyalty, an attractive range of wireless 
services and handsets, and an infrastructure providing nationwide high-quality and 
stable wireless communication. Along with these factors and the fact that handsets are 
operator specific in Japan (i.e. subscribers buy bundled handsets branded with 
DoCoMo and not e.g. NEC or Nokia), DoCoMo’s superior ties with handset 
producers and technological leadership in the dominating PDC standard, DoCoMo 
was able to charge a 5-10% price premium, and to offer lower incentives to retailers 
than competitors. To illustrate, the differentiation strategy involved the launch of the 
first 100g handset in 1996, which helped establishing the DoCoMo brand firmly in 
consumers’ minds as innovative and value-added. The main competitor DDI was only 
second to DoCoMo with almost as good image, products, and network efficiency. The 
four regional operators offered low-cost wireless services at similar low price levels.  
  
Clearly, the 1994 liberalization achieved much of intended effects on prices and 
service quality, but NTT DoCoMo continued be to market leader. A key reason 
competitors always lagged behind the company in the development of new handsets 
and services was that they were forced to use NTT DoCoMo’s own proprietary PDC 
system (Morgan Stanley, July 1998). The technology was the Japanese 2G parallel to 
the European GSM standard defining the transmission standard for wireless signals, 
and thereby all infrastructure and handsets had to comply with the standard. The 
disadvantages were substantial as (1) NTT DoCoMo with its enormous R&D muscle 
led the advancements of the PDC system, (2) competing operators could not benefit 
from NTT DoCoMo´s state-of-the-art infrastructure as regulations required the 
competitors to operate their own networks, and (3) likewise since handsets and 
wireless services are operator-specific in Japan (i.e. users with different operators 
cannot communicate), no spill-overs could be reaped from the R&D and financially 
superior market leader (Morgan Stanley, July 1998; Morgan Stanley, August 1997; 
Kodoma, 1998). 
 
By early 1997, the wireless market growth witnessed early signs of saturation. While, 
the total market had passed the 20 million subscriber mark, the impressive 100%+ 
subscriber growth rates in 1995-1997 started to decline, as did handset subsidies. 
Therefore, 1997 was dominated by aggressive sales campaigns, and for NTT 
DoCoMo´s part new tariff schemes eliminating subscription fees and new value-
added services supported the further growth of the subscriber base and market 
leadership. In fact, the company’s market share recovered rapidly from the all-time 
low of 48,4% in 1995 to 57% in early 1998. Indeed, the gab was widening between 
the highly profitable NTT DoCoMo and competitors as evident from differences in 
relative subscriber growth. To illustrate, in 1997, main competitor DDI saw a 38.2% 
decline, Digital Phone a 44.7% contraction, Tu-ka a 52.7% fall, and Digital Tu-ka an 
8.5% slide. Only low-cost IDO had subscriber growth among competitors, however at 
the cost of being the only operator with declining earnings. Thus, all other carriers 
managed to get profits despite lowered prices on subscriptions and air-time. This 
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reflects the undisputed market attractiveness that in absolute terms has continued to 
grow with 9-11 million new subscribers yearly. 
 
Competitor consolidation: 1997 - 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 94 95 96 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 
 
However, an alliance between two competitors would soon signal changes in the 
DoCoMo´s stable and favorable competitive landscape. Thereby an era of 
consolidation among DoCoMo´s competitors was augmented that would last until 
2001. In April 1997, early entrants DDI and IDO responded to the NTT DoCoMo 
supremacy by allying to jointly upgrade their PDC networks to CDMA, a competing 
2G wireless transmission standard developed by US Qualcomm. Thereby the two 
regional operators collectively reached 100% population coverage (Morgan Stanley, 
August 1997). The competitive background was that the two operators were facing 
rapid erosion of their market shares from 1996 to 1998 (DDI from 22% to 9%, and 
IDO from 16 to 8%) due to price competition from two new entrants (Digital phone 
and Tu-Ka) and DoCoMo increases market share again (TCA, 2003; Appendix). For 
the roll-out of CDMA networks, international sourcing from mainly US Motorola and 
Qualcomm rather than the traditional DoCoMo PDC vendors from the ‘NTT Family’ 
signaled new times (Wireless Review, February 1998). 
 
In April 1999, DDI and IDO each launched cdmaOne wireless services with new 
compatible handsets from XX. Promptly, NTT DoCoMo’s position as the only value-
added operator was challenged. The CDMA network performed better than 
DoCoMo’s PDC network e.g. in terms of higher sound quality, connectivity and 
stability. Thus, while DoCoMo’s proprietary PDC network had been an essential 
driver of the Japanese wireless market development and growth due to low-cost tariffs 
and handsets, serious competition was emerging. Indeed, the subscriber growth had 
led to capacity problems on the PDC network, and voice quality had been lowered to 
half-bit-rate. Thus, DDI and IDO pursued the window of opportunity by marketing 
quality cdmaOne services and the slightly more expensive cdma-handsets to 
DoCoMo’s premium private and especially corporate subscribers (Morgan Stanley, 
July 1998). The cdmaOne services would prove successful, and within 6 month 1 
million subscribers were attracted and within 2 years 6 million subscribed to the 
operators cdmaOne wireless services (TCA, 2003; Telecommunications International, 
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October 1999). From 1998 to 2000, however, both operators suffered from the initial 
investments in cdmaOne network and ad campaigns, and while their market position 
was improving, profits were declining (Morgan Stanley, July 1999). Even worse, soon 
after the two operators gained momentum to threaten DoCoMo’s market share, the 
market leader would launch the infamous I-mode Internet service, competitor J-Phone 
was both increasing market share and profits, and part of the cdmaOne subscriber 
growth was achieved at the expense of the operators existing PDC customers (Morgan 
Stanley, January 2000).  
 
In response, the partners continued to consolidate. In fall 1999, DDI, the former leader 
among DoCoMo’s competitors, acquired the PDC-based Tu-Ka operator from Nissan 
as the latter exited the wireless market (Morgan Stanley, July 2000). In October 2000, 
the final step was taken through a merger between DDI, IDO and new third partner 
KDD; Japans long-time leader in international fix-line traffic. After 1985, KDD 
successfully operated as monopoly in international calls largely locked out from 
domestic services, but due to intensified competition, market shares declined and the 
first net loss ever was recorded in 1999 (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 
1999). Now, by combining the fix-line and wireless business of the three companies, a 
complete telecom carrier able to compete with NTT/DoCoMo in all four telecom 
segments was established.  
 
"We will challenge NTT's mastery of the market," KDDI President Yusai Okuyama 
said at the launch (Far Eastern Economic Review, October 2000). 
 
The combined wireless market share of 25% again established the group as no. 2, and 
the integration of DDI and IDO’s services gave potential for a unified nationwide 
service with a strong brand image. Also, synergies were expected from DDI’s big 
subscriber base complemented by KDD’s Internet knowledge, and interaction with 
shareholder Toyota Motor would enhance prospects for car-electronics and in-car 
Internet markets. With the merger, common interests had bridged previous differences 
between the management of Kyocera, a major DDI shareholder, and that of Toyota, 
IDO’s main backer (Morgan Stanley, July 2000; Far Eastern Economic Review, 
October 2000). 
 
Consolidation behind the J-Phone Group 
 
The DDI and IDO tie-up became the first step in the consolidation process. A 
facilitating factor was a 1998 legislation liberalized the strict ownership rules for 
telecom carriers and pawed the road for foreign operators to pursue their interest in 
the booming Japanese wireless market. The consolidation that eventually led to 
today’s #3, the J-Phone Group, was initiated with the late entries of the regional 
wireless carriers Digital Phone in 1995 and Digital Tu-Ka in 1996. Despite both 
firms’ poor profitability, in 1998, Japan Telecom, a telecom carrier focused in 
domestic fix-line long distance calls, branched into wireless telecom by taking a 23% 
equity stake in each carrier and thereby joined the other two majority owners, Nissan 
and Airtouch (Morgan Stanley, July 1998). The three owners jointly applied for one 
3G license and thereby foresaw future consolidation (Communications International, 
March 1999). With market presence in both fix-line and wireless telecommunications, 
the alliance attracted BT and AT&T to invest 220bn in Japan Telecom for a 30% 
equity stake. The improved financial momentum fuelled investments in fix-line local 
 Page 12
networks and data communication, as well as 3G wireless technologies. Thus, Digital 
Phone and Digital Tu-Ka continued to operate on a PDC network, and after long time 
of poor profitability both were profitable due to aggressive ad campaigns, a new 
discount service and especially Digital Phone’s popularization of SMS/Email services 
(Telecommunications International, October 1999; Morgan Stanley, January 2000). In 
2000, Nissan decided to exit the wireless telecommunications market, and sold its 
stake in Digital Tu-Ka to Japan Telecom, which then consolidated the two carriers 
into J-Phone (Morgan Stanley, July 2000). The last milestone in the J-Phone 
consolidation process occurred in October 2001, when Vodaphone increased its 45% 
stake in Japan Telecom to 67% with the ambition to eat market shares from DoCoMo 
and #2 KDDI, while boosting profitability. At this point, J-Phone had just experienced 
rapid market growth due to a successful world-first wireless picture email service 
enabled by camera phones (Wall Street Journal, October 2001). 
 
After the consolidation process, the competitive landscape had NTT as market leader 
with KDDI being chased by Japan Telecom. Each company operates in fixed-line, 
wireless and international markets and each has been awarded a license for the next 
generation of wireless services called 3G, or third generation (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, October 2000). 
 
Wireless service and handset innovations: From voice to data 
 
Table: Wireless market subscribers (000) by operator, March each year. 
 1991/31992/3 1993/3 1994/31995/31996/31997/31998/31999/32000/3 2001/3 2002/3 dec-
02 
jan-
03 
Total market 868 1378 1712 2131 4331 10204 20876 31526 41530 51141 60943 69121 7351473900
DoCoMo 549 846 1027 1323 2206 4936 10960 17984 23898 29356 36026 40783 4287443033
KDDI 
(consolidated) 
 
 806 1844 4095 5553 9420 11453 13619 14940 16105 1731717411
au (KDDI) 10986 12214 1346813583
Tu-ka (KDDI)  259 1005 1899 2323 2890 3494 3954 3891 3849 3828
J-Phone 
(consolidated)  281 1173 2873 4123 6179 8166 9978 12232 1332313456
IDO Corp 335 635 1130 1722 2768 3265 3895 KDDI 
DDI Cellular  471 950 1960 1932 4329 5298 6230 KDDI 
Digital Phone  281 1080 1913 2373 3906 J-Phone 
Digital Tu-ka  93 960 1750 2273 J-Phone 
Source: TCA, 2003 
Italics: subscribers summarized for KDDI firms (Tu-Ka, IDO and DDI) and for J-
Phone firms (Digital Phone and Digital Tu-Ka) for comparison. 
 
Voice market saturation 
 
In the late 1990s, the accelerating consolidation was only one key development 
augmenting the Japanese Wireless market. The 100%+ growth rates of the mid-90s 
were supplanted by falling mobile subscriber growth, and the mobile penetration rate 
had reached 33% of the population with a total of 43 million subscribers. While 
traditional voice services still accounted for 99% of network traffic (i.e. data services 
were miniscule), voice ARPUs (average revenue per user) were steadily falling due to 
lower call rate and discount services driven by price competition (Morgan Stanley 
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July 1999; Morgan Stanley January 2000). The price competition and market 
saturation forced the operators to focus on subscriber retention and reducing churn, 
which they on the short-term did by improving voice quality and providing value-
added text services. Surely, operators’ profits continued to rise, as subscriber growth 
still added 10 million yearly, but the mid-term need for new growth and revenue 
sources was obvious. By early 1999, wireless data services were still simple and 
confined mainly to SMS and data transfers that had not captured many subscribers 
(Nomura, 1998). In data transfer services, DoCoMo was market leader with 28 Kbps 
transfers, Digital Phone (later part of J-Phone) had successfully popularized SMS, and 
DDI (later part of KDDI) had gained 
some growth momentum with its 
technologically superior cdmaOne 
service offering better quality than 
DoCoMo’s PDC-based services 
(Morgan Stanley, January 2000). 
 
1999: DoCoMo’s strategy change 
and the I-mode Wireless Internet 
service 
 
Against the worrisome 
developments, DoCoMo formulated 
a new competitive strategy, Vision 
2010, which comprises five core 
elements articulated in the acronym MAGIC; (1) Mobile multimedia (i.e. increase 
modes of communication beyond simple voice communication), (2) Anytime, 
anywhere, anyone (i.e. widespread accessibility of mobile services), (3) Global 
mobility support (i.e. global seamless mobile communication), (4) Integrated wireless 
solutions (i.e. meet user needs beyond person-to-person communication to machine-
to-machine, and person-to-machine communication), and (5) Customized personal 
service (i.e. tailoring services to particular needs of each business or individual user). 
MAGIC wireless telecommunication essentially expresses the image of the wireless 
telecommunications market and services that NTT DoCoMo is striving to develop in 
collaboration with partners “to realize the full potential of mobile multimedia 
communication” (NTT DoCoMo press release, 25.03.1999; NTT DoCoMo Press Kit, 
2001). DoCoMo’s market scope was expanded from the Japanese home market to 
overseas wireless markets in primarily Asia, Europe and US. In response to the 
saturating market and intensified competition the wireless service scope was 
expanded to focus on generating network traffic with data-based services supported 
by more advanced mobile handsets. 
 
In February 1999, DoCoMo’s launch of its now famous and world-first I-mode 
Internet service marked the shift from a volume-based to a value-based growth 
strategy. In April 1999, KDDI followed with EzWeb, and in December 1999 J-Phone 
followed with J-Sky. I-mode impressed with an breath-taking speed of penetration 
signing more than 10,000 new subscribers daily, and has since heavily outperformed 
the competing services (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1999; 
Telecommunications International, October 1999). Intrinsic qualities of I-mode drove 
its success; Firstly, the packet-switched I-mode technology platform encouraged 
frequent as subscribers were “always-on” while paying for data-transfers rather than 
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air-time. Secondly, DoCoMo had chosen compactHTML as programming language 
for the I-mode technology platform, which due to compatibility with HTML from 
WWW allowed content providers to easily convert existing HTML sites or 
programme new sites. In comparison, the technology platforms of EzWeb and J-Sky 
were circuit-switched (i.e. subscribers paid for airtime which discouraged e.g. surfing 
the wireless Internet services) and used WAP - a programming language most content  
providers were unfamiliar with. Thereby, given the slow transmission speeds (9,6 
kbps) I-mode was relatively inexpensive as transmission charges is calculated on 
volume of data sent, and not air-time like competitors (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
August 1999).  
 
Since the technology platform build on existing technologies (i.e. cHTML and the 
PDC network was packet switched), DoCoMo could rapidly rollout I-mode 
nationwide at low investment costs (Ratliff, 2002). I-mode has, however, been 
celebrated much more for its innovative business model, customer orientation and 
facilitation of a content provision industry than for its technology. Defining itself as a 
platform leader focused on wireless technology and not content provision of the new 
mobile Internet, with inspiration from AOL’s www-service DoCoMo conceived a 
business model based on revenue-sharing offered to official I-mode content providers. 
The service fees were split with 91% for the content provider and 9% for DoCoMo, 
who in return handled the complicated billing task (i.e. subscribers would not pay 
directly to the content provider, but be charged on the monthly bill). Like AOL, 
official content providers were subjected to strict quality requirements for content 
offered, and in return featured on the default I-mode menus on I-mode compatible 
handsets. Generous revenue sharing, easy access to content sites, quality requirements 
were instrumental to the development of a previously non-existing and highly 
competitive content industry that continued to innovate with new attractive services 
user were willing to pay for and thereby creating traffic on DoCoMo’s network. The 
usability was also high, as the I-mode Internet was simply access by pushing the “I” 
button on the handset. Already from day one, basic content services were available 
within news, weather, mobile banking, securities, ticket reservations, train times, 
cooking recipes, maps, travel, mobile shopping, gourmet and lifestyle, job banks, 
music, karaoke, book purchases, games, fortune-telling, sports results, TV and radio, 
dictionaries, and the ever increasing number of content providers have only added to 
the plurality of offered services (Far Eastern Economic Review, August 1999; Mulder 
and Simpson, 2001). For instance within 6 months, I-mode had already secured 
participation by all eight national banks, more than 10 regional banks, and a large 
number of securities, credit card and airline companies (Telecommunications 
International, October 1999). The i-mode launch was complemented with 4 new I-
mode compatible handsets that set new standards. The explosive up-take of I-mode 
created substantial network-effects in that increasing numbers of attractive content 
sites, increased the number of subscribers, which in return attracted new content 
providers. 
 
The superior I-mode service and the wireless Internet became the first killer data 
application in Japan, and thereby started a belated Internet revolution in Japan that 
due to low PC penetration had not occurred previously (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, August 1999; Morgan Stanley, July 1999). 
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2000-2003: Data service innovation and competition 
 
Intro: Changing competitive nature 
 
The rapidly expanding wireless Internet punctuated a fundamental shift in the 
Japanese wireless market towards a more dynamic competitive environment. By early 
2000, the industry’s focus was changed towards non-voice services, and signs of 
increasing demand were compelling in the light of the saturated voice market 
(Morgan Stanley, January 2000). The industry consolidation saw the emergence of 
two strong competitors backed by international investors, and while the old 
monopolist and market dominator had clear won the first round in the race for new 
wireless data services with I-mode, the two competitors would soon prove capable of 
innovating new attractive data services. 
 
Although competition was increasingly dynamic, since 1998 only minor changes had 
occurred in each of the three competitors overall market share. From September 1998 
to January 2003, DoCoMo’s share went from 56,8% to 58% with a high of 59,1%, 
KDDI’s share steadily declined from 29% to 23,6% with a low of 23,3%, and J-
Phone’s market share steadily climbed from 14,2% to the all-time high of 18,2% 
(TCA, 2003). Below the gradual shifts of market shares, however, lies an increasingly 
intense and innovation-based competitive situation. The battle for market shares is 
evident from the competitors’ changing shares of market growth, in which current 
subscriber uptake is not weighed down by the grand number of total subscribers. The 
below chart shows the difference between the operators’ share of last quarters 
subscriber growth and their overall market share, which indicates whether market 
shares were won or lost (i.e. in September 2000, DoCoMo had 59% market share, but 
80% of market growth in 3Q 2000). When a company lies at 0, the current market 
share is sustained, when above 0, market shares are won, and below 0 market shares 
are lost. 
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The battle for market shares now evolved around more competitive parameters than 
during DoCoMo’s dominance as premium provider during the 1990s. IDO and DDI’s 
rollout of the cdmaOne network led to competition on network quality in terms of 
data transfer speeds, capacity and voice quality. Along with network competition, 
corporate branding became important to differentiate premium services from standard 
services. With consolidation, all three competitors were striving for 100% nationwide 
coverage that also for new 3G services has become a crucial competitive parameter. 
Moving away from traditional voice services, accelerated product differentiation of 
operators’ bundles of operator-specific handsets and operator-specific services 
became imperative. Also, coordination of service launches and availability of new 
service-enabling handsets became crucial as data service often requires supporting 
software (i.e. Java) and hardware (i.e. cameras, color screens). Thereby, service 
uptake now increasingly drove handset replacements. In addition to supporting new 
service applications, handsets generally have been improved in terms of weight, 
battery life, processing power, menu usability, and indeed high-functionality handsets 
have become popular. 
 
Regarding new data service innovation, the quest for new killer applications had been 
kick-started by I-mode that had co-opted KDDI’s growing success with its higher-
quality cdmaOne network during 1999. From 2000 to 2003, each competitor have had 
success with different killer applications; like in the case of I-mode first movers have 
won first rounds. With these killer applications, the competitors have won and lost 
growth shares in intense competition, while overall largely sustaining their total 
market shares. (Based on the Japanese experience killer applications are characterized 
by rapid subscriber uptake, increasing ARPUs often stabilizing at 50%+ of non-users, 
and over time a high percentage of a firms total subscribers use the killer app).  
 
Networks and Branding: Premium and Budget services  
 
Prior to the industry consolidation, DoCoMo enjoyed the status as sole premium 
brand operator in the market. With the cleverly branded I-mode service, traditional 
voice service run on the 2G PDC network were differentiated from the new innovative 
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data services, thus establishing I-mode (I-mode phones enable regular PDC voice 
communication) as a premium brand. With the high-quality cdmaOne network 
launched by now partners DDI and IDO, KDDI had establishes a premium wireless 
service that by November 2001 had attracted impressive 10 million subscribers. A key 
contributor to the surge was the introduction of the company’s Au (pronounced ay-
yob) premium brand for its cdma-services after the KDDI merger in October 2000 
broke the branding grip of DoCoMo that had protected DoCoMo despite at times 
superior pricing and technology of KDDI (FEER, Oct00). Like, DoCoMo a low-cost 
brand was sustained as the brand Tu-Ka has been used for PDC-based services. 
Unlike KDDI, J-Phone continued to operate on DoCoMo’s proprietary PDC 
technology, and focused on service innovation rather than network rollouts. Following 
competitors, J-Phone launched the low-cost brand “Simple Phone” with basic 
handsets oriented towards voice and SMS. Compared to the premium service offering 
wireless Internet and picture messaging, however, “Simple Phone” has achieved 
limited uptake (250.000 by February 2002) (Company press releases; TCA, 2003). 
 
The launch of 3G wireless networks has added a new dimension to branding. In 
October 2001, DoCoMo launched the world’s first 3G wireless services on its 
proprietary high-speed WCDMA network under the brand name FOMA. To date, 
uptake of FOMA has been sluggish with currently 150.000 subscribers more than 2 
years after launch, which has been attributed to lacking multimedia content justifying 
migration from I-mode on PDC handsets, too high tariffs, limited availability of 
FOMA handsets, low connectivity, poor geographical coverage, technical glitches 
with the new WCDMA network and interoperability problems with handsets. Also, 
FOMA has failed to boost ARPUs of users compared to I-mode (Appendix). In April 
2002, having learned from FOMA, KDDI launched its 3G network with close to full 
nationwide coverage and high network stability. KDDI’s investments costs were 
significantly lower as the migration from cdmaOne to their 3G technology cdma2000 
1x was achieved with simple software updates of the infrastructure and new cards in 
cell phones (DoCoMo had to build a whole new network). KDDI chose not to brand 
their 3G services separately, but sell them under the ‘Au’ premium brand offering the 
same services only faster and cheaper than FOMA. Thereby, consumers focused on 
functionality rather than technology, and the rapid uptake of totally 5 million as of 
January 2003 supports the strategy. Early experienced showed that 44% of 3G 
customers were new, while the rest transferred from cdmaOne. In comparison with 
WCDMA’s 384 downlink and 64 uplink speeds, cdma2000 1x enables up- and 
downloads at 144 kbps, which has proven sufficient with current services. By October 
2003, however, KDDI has scheduled another incremental upgrade of the cdma 
network to cdma2000 1x EVO enabling 2,4Mbps transfers. In contrast to FOMA, a 
survey of 20.000 3G Au users found that ARPUs are definitely rising with currently 
8%+. (KDDI, 2003; Reuters, 20.12.2002; Company press releases; TCA, 2003; 
Wireless Asia, August 2002; Business Week, June 2002). Latecomer J-Phone 
launched their 3G services in December 2002 based on a WCDMA network. 
 
JAVA: DoCoMo builds on the I-mode success with platform innovations 
 
In January 2001, DoCoMo enhanced the I-mode platform with I-appli co-developed 
with JAVA-inventor SUN to support JAVA on I-appli enabled I-mode handsets that 
soon followed. The platform upgrade enables download and storage of stand-alone 
applications such as shooting-type video games, animations, standby clock, and 
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karaoke, thereby eliminating the need to continually connect to a website. I-appli also 
enables agent-type applications with automatic updates of constantly changing 
information such as stock quotes, weather forecast, online interactive games at set 
times (NTT DoCoMo press release, 18.01.2001). JAVA enables content providers to 
offer far more complex applications, because they can write their own ‘applets’ (i.e. 
programs) to run on handsets. Also, JAVA offers an enhanced graphical environment 
and the ability to securely download new applications to handsets (Wireless Review, 
March 2001). In June 2001, both KDDI and J-Phone enhanced their web-services 
with JAVA-services enabled by software developed by Aplix, and subsequently 
launched compatible handsets. KDDI branded its service EzPlus, while J-Phone 
included JAVA into the J-Sky web service without separate branding. Although the 
competing services offered higher download capacity than I-appli’s 10kb at one time 
(30 kilobytes for J-phone and 50 kilobytes for au), thanks to the success of I-mode, 
the vast number of content providers and early introduction of JAVA, DoCoMo’s 
services has heavily outperformed the others (Morgan Stanley, June 2001). Whereas, 
e.g. J-Phone JAVA enabled handsets reached 1 million in October 2001 and 2 million 
in February 2002 (Company press releases), I-appli handsets saw rapid uptake with 4 
million by June 2001, 10 million by December 2001, 15 million by September 2002, 
and 15,5 million by December 2002 (NTT DoCoMo, January 2003). In the quest to 
generate more data traffic and boast ARPUs, I-appli has proven highly efficient as 
early I-appli adapters after launch generated 6 times as much traffic as regular users. 
As I-appli subscribers rocketed to 43% of all I-mode users by December 2002, I-appli 
traffic usage stabilized at 50% more than normal I-mode users (NTT DoCoMo, 
January 2003). Since, July 2002, however, the uptake of I-appli has saturated at 43% 
of all I-mode users. 
 
Picture messaging: J-Phone is still leading the pack 
 
Breaking DoCoMo’s supremacy in new service innovations, J-Phone launched the 
world’s first handsets with build-in cameras in November 2000, and the Sha-mail 
photo emailing service enabling camera-handset users to send and receive pictures 
was launched in November 2001. The killer application witnessed rapid uptake with 1 
million users in June 2001, 3 million in December 2001, 6 million in August 2002, 
and now 8 million in January 2003. Thereby, 60% of J-Phone’s subscribers now have 
a camera phone up from 46% in July 2002. In October 2002, the Sha-mail@Album 
service was launched providing subscribers with a 20mb online storage for pictures to 
compensate for handsets limited storage capacity. The Sha-mail service propelled 
users ARPUs with 44% in comparison with J-Phone non-users (Communications 
International, June 2002). Competitors KDDI followed in April 2002 with camera-
phones as a key application of the 3G cdma2000 1x launch under the ‘au’ brand 
name. By December 2002, KDDI had 2,5 million camera users that contributed to the 
3G outpacing of DoCoMo’s FOMA service. DoCoMo was the last to follow J-Phone 
(picture messaging was offered under the FOMA brand already in October 2001, but 
due to sluggish FOMA take-up not widely used). In June 2002, DoCoMo launched 
the I-shot picture messaging service and by November 2002, 4 million I-shot cameras 
had been sold corresponding to 10% of all DoCoMo subscribers (Wireless Asia, 
August 2002; NTT DoCoMo, January 2003). 
 
The success of picture messaging relates to its apparent consumer appeal, the user-
originated content avoids problems of creating compelling content, and for operators 
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the content is for free. Part of J-Phones such is due to a compelling handset line up of 
more than 17 models from e.g. NEC, Sanyo and Nokia. In comparison, early I-shot 
camera phones did not live up to J-Phones usability, but recent launches have 
improved DoCoMo’s position. Photo-services have come to reignite the saturating 
Japanese market, and thus are crucial for the three competitors in the race for 
customer acquisition (Wireless Asia, August 2002). Moreover, until recently the 
photo services have enabled both KDDI and J-Phone to partly catch up with 
DoCoMo. However, since June 2002, J-Phone has added only 2,8 million Sha-mail 
subscribers, whereas DoCoMo has added more than 5 million in the same timespan 
(Reuters, 15.1.2003). 
 
Videophoning, wireless movie and music: still too early to know 
 
For some time now, a new buzzword in wireless telecom has been MMS to succeed 
the enormously successful SMS services. In addition to simple still photos (see 
above), more advanced content such as videophoning, as well as downloading and/or 
streaming of video clips of movietrailers, entire movies and music files is entering 
wireless arena. In the quest to recoup the large investments in new network 
infrastructure, wireless operators are hoping for large-scale MMS up-take as 
multimedia content requires high bandwidth technologies.  
 
In November 2001, DoCoMo launched the ‘I-motion’ service on its FOMA network 
enabling approx. 30 seconds video clips and 100 second audio clips to be downloaded 
to compatible handsets at 384Kbps downlink and 64Kbps uplink (Press release). 
Videophoning (i.e. caller and receiver see each other) was also supported. Competitor 
KDDI followed promptly in December 2001 with the EzMovie application running on 
its premium ‘Au’ platform. In this category, KDDI has had the most success with its 
EzMovie co-launched with the GPS-enabled EzNavigation. At 64 Kbps, users can 
reach both paid and free contents in MP3 and MPEG4 such as movies, music, news, 
weather reports, and contents relating to cartoon characters, sports, fashion, 
celebrities, comedy and entertainment. Together with EzNavigation, EzMovie had 
attracted 4 million subscribers by December 2002 pointing to the quality of the 
cdmaOne and cdma2000 networks. Lacking a high-capacity network, in March 2002 
J-Phone launched its movie-shamail service enabling transmission of recorded video 
messages up to 5 seconds transferred at 28,8 Kbps. By November 2002, however, 
only 1 million subscribers had movie-shamail enabled handsets. To date, despite high 
expectations, the advanced MMS services have not proven themselves worthy of the 
‘killer app’ label. This also goes for DoCoMo. I-motion was the first new service to 
take advantage of the WCDMAs fast transfer speeds, but no mass market has been 
created due to inadequate audio and video content, and problems with FOMA 
including poor stability, pricy handsets, short battery life and lacking nationwide 
coverage. Also, at launch only 4000 videophones were available that were sold out in 
the first three days. Thus, still there is more of a buzz surrounding camera phones that 
have become the latest fad among young Japanese rather than the more advanced 
MMS services offered e.g. by FOMA (Financial Times, November 2002; Company 
press releases; Telecommunications International, February 2002; Far Eastern 
Economic Review, July 2001). 
 
GPS/Location services: KDDI taking the lead 
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Many industry observers expect great things from wireless services that take 
advantage of knowing the position of the user, so-called location-based services. 
DoCoMo launched the simple I-area service in June 2001. By choosing the current 
location in a menu list, the user can access local information on e.g. restaurants, 
weather, maps and town information on e.g. galleries and hotels (Company press 
releases). Already in May 2000, J-Phone had launched its similar J-Navi service and 
the enhanced Station area-info service in October 2000. Both services require no 
special handsets, and are part of the companies’ wireless Internet services (i.e. no data 
on user uptake available). 
 
In December 2001, KDDI launched the more advanced and GPS-enabled service 
branded EzNavigation that requires GPS-enabled handsets. The user’s location is 
automatically determined via the global satellite communications system (GPS). In 
addition to map functions, gourmet town guides, communications services, traffic 
information and weather reports, emails can be pushed to users from nearby shops, 
and families and friends are able to check on the location of family members, and 
emergency signals can be sent out should the need arise (Company press releases). 
EzNavigation has since been one of the main applications running under KDDI’s 
premium brand Au. The service uptake rose from 1 million in May 2002, to 3 Million 
in August 2002, and 4 million in December 2002. Also, in October 2002 a GPS 
services was launched on the 3G cdma2000 1x network enabling companies to track 
personnel and allow staff members to communicate their status as known from 
Internet messaging services (i.e. at lunch, in meeting, in car etc.). DoCoMo’s GPS 
service DoCo-desu services enabling users to find the position of goods and persons 
had by November 2002 only attracted 1100 subscribers (Company press releases, 
NTT DoCoMo, November 2002). 
 
Following the regulatory on DoCoMo to enable other operators to access its wireless 
Internet, from March 2002 J-Phone will expand its Station services with ‘Loco guide’ 
that offers access to the currently 482 I-area sites (Company press releases). 
Strategic challenges 
 
In the following, a detailed study of three of NTT DoCoMo’s distinctive strategic 
challenges is presented. In particular, insights are provided as how the company 
approaches the (1) orchestrating of innovation with the examples of I-mode, C-mode, 
and Telematics services, (2) relational challenges with the examples of technology 
standardization alliances, interfirm relationships with handset providers and 
internationalization partners, and lastly (3) how new growth avenues are explored. 
 
Orchestrating innovation 
 
After the Second World War, parent NTT was established to pursue the government-
set objective to nurture and support a strong family of firms that would provide the 
essential technological underpinnings of the electronics industry in Japan. The NTT 
Family consisted primarily of ‘the big four’ NEC, Fujitsu, Oki and Hitachi, but 
counted a couple of hundred firms. NTT dominated and provided innovative 
leadership for the family within telecommunications and electronics with its huge 
internal R&D, and huge budget for collaborative R&D and procurement 
(Anchordoguy, 2001). DoCoMo inherited many of the external family relations, and 
builds its innovative strategy on platform leadership by developing and proliferating 
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core proprietary wireless technologies and standards, as well as co-develop 
compatible infrastructure, handsets and service applications now both with domestic 
and overseas partners (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). Wireless innovation is 
increasingly complex due to increasing wireless technological complexity and the 
convergence with previously unrelated industries such as IT, media, entertainment, 
automotive and more. The intrinsic innovation challenges for new wireless data 
services and enabling equipment is a hard test for the platform leadership model. To 
illustrate, three recent innovations exemplify DoCoMo’s platform leadership strategy 
to orchestrate innovation in the new era of wireless data telecommunications. 
 
Innovating I-mode 
 
With more than 36 million subscribers, more than 55.000 content sites, 
and on-going global diffusion, by now I-mode is by far the most 
successful wireless Internet service in the world, and still the main 
Internet access point in Japan. The basic Internet service was launched 
in February 1999 with access to a few Internet content sites in 
entertainment, banking and more. Since, the platform has evolved with 
new features such as I-melody, I-appli, I-area, I-motion and I-shot, and thereby been 
DoCoMo’s key 2G data brand and technology platform (the 3G successor is called 
FOMA).  
 
In 1997, in response to predictions on saturation of wireless voice services, the 
company’s first CEO (1992-1998), Kouji Oshboshi, commissioned the corporate 
business director, Keiichi Enoki, to build a project organization to develop new non-
voice wireless services, empowered him to recruit internally as well as externally (the 
latter was quite unheard of for DoCoMo and parent NTT), and gave him the financial 
and managerial mandate to launch developed services. Initially staffed with 10 diverse 
and highly talented personnel, the project grew to 70 persons by August 1997, by 
which time the unit evolved into the Gateway Business Department. Key managers 
were electrical engineer and head, Keiichi Enoki, seasoned manager and outside talent 
Mrs. Matsunaga, and the Internet entrepreneur, Takeshi Natsuno. In entrepreneurial 
spirit, seven working groups worked on flexible and autonomous terms with seven 
identified facets of wireless service development (network server, mobile phone, 
facility building, facility maintenance, system/sales, content and application). 
Managerial emphasis was placed on “prompt decision making and expedious 
activities”. Top management support in the larger traditional organization was 
fostered through the established Mobile Gateway service introduction promotion 
committee seated with managers from all branches (Kodama, 2001). To develop both 
the technological and market side of wireless services, four communities were formed 
(in-house, portal, technical and platform) with participants also from other DoCoMo 
divisions, external content providers, and consumer groups. After the commercial 
launch of I-mode in February 1999, the working group participation of external 
parties was continued and formalized into three communities. Strategic alliances were 
formed with content providers to improve information available on the I-mode portal 
(i.e. the portal community), handset producers and handset application partners to 
develop and enhance I-mode handsets (i.e. the technical community), and lastly to 
expand the scope of I-mode availability alliances with other platform vendors within 
e.g. games industry and overseas wireless operators were formed (i.e. the platform 
community).  
 Page 22
 
Inspired by AOL’s Internet platform approach in USA, the department worked around 
a business model rather than a technology as had been the norm with traditional 
wireless voice and simple data services. Also, I-mode was entirely built on existing 
technologies to minimize time to market (Business Week, January 2000; Mulder and 
Simpson, 2001; Kodama, 2001). The innovative I-mode business model that provides 
entrepreneurial incentives has been key to the emergence of the rich network of 
content providers. In a generous profit sharing scheme offered to official I-mode 
content providers signing a contractual agreement, the Company mediates otherwise 
complex billing of wireless data services by conveniently charging subscribers for 
accessed information, services and m-commerce on their monthly subscription bills 
for a 9% commission fee (i.e. 91% of collected fees are transferred to the respective 
content providers). Separately, the Company charges subscribers on network traffic 
based on the number of data packets transferred, which constitutes the most 
significant revenue source from I-mode. Official content providers are featured on the 
official I-mode gateway portal enhanced with innovative application platforms and 
directly accessible through the I-mode menus and search engines. In return, official 
content providers are contractually obliged to comply with four simple quality rules 
for the wireless content, and in periodic evaluations content providers are assessed in 
terms of these four rules and the network traffic generated. The four quality rules 
require that (1) all content must be as current as possible (i.e. several daily updates), 
(2) all content must be as comprehensive as possible and link to related information, 
(3) content must be designed attractively to encourage repeat visits, and (4) content 
must be highly readable, so that users can easily understand the information and 
services available to them. Moreover, content must be accessible in the cHTML 
programming language that easily converts from e.g. existing HTML and XML 
content. The billing system and the cHTML-based wireless content system provide a 
simple interface for daily operations and low task interdependence. The business 
model is offered to official content providers (i.e. with billing service, access through 
the official I-mode portal and menu system), and NTT DoCoMo solely decides who is 
accredited with the official status (Telecommuncations International, February 2001; 
Economist, March 2002; America’s network, March 2000; Ratliff, 2002; McKinsey, 
2000b; www.nttdocomo.com). 
 
I-mode initially offered a range of basic data-related wireless services in addition to 
traditional voice communication, and the range has continuously have been expanded 
with new innovative services. Technologically speaking, the main features of the PDC 
network are that it is packet-switched enabling ‘always-on’ access to wireless data 
services, it supports 9,6 Kbps (recently upgraded to 28,8 Kbps) up and downlink data 
transfers, and for I-mode a wireless content platform build on c-HTML programming 
languages allows internet content providers to easily convert existing web pages to I-
mode content sites (e.g. Mulder and Simpson, 2001). The basic wireless data services 
are access to official I-mode information sites and un-official I-mode compatible 
information sites, an email service, and a message service. The I-mode user can 
access internet-like sites (now above 3.000 official I-mode sites (at launch 100) and 
above 55.000 un-official sites (at launch 500)) in areas such as news, weather, mobile 
banking, securities, traffic, maps, travel, mobile shopping, gourmet and lifestyle, job 
banks, music, karaoke, games, fortune-telling, sports results, TV and radio, 
dictionaries (NTT DoCoMo Press Kit, 2001). Fundamental to I-mode’s enormous 
commercial success has been the ever-increasing number of services provided through 
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the platform, and the ease of use. Subscribers enjoy attractive content, innovative 
services, easy billing, simplicity of use, and advanced features enabled by Appli; a 
platform upgrade introduced in January 2001 to support JAVA and subsequently 
underpinned with Appli mobile handset launches. In 2000, the main content 
improvement was addition of English I-mode menus and content. In 2001 and 2002, 
frequent launches of new innovative service applications have significantly expanded 
the I-mode service many of which are JAVA enabled: international roaming services 
in Europe, Asia, Africa and recently also in US, I-area for location-specific services, a 
GPS based position service, a billing information service enabled by Appli, the I-
mode session service providing companies more reliable connections, an anti-spam 
option for I-mode email, C-mode enabling users to buy products from Coca-Cola 
vending machines with their I-mode phone, to buy admission tickets to amusement 
facilities, to pay-per-download of information content and local area information such 
as maps, and most recently the I-shot service enabling transmission of photos taken 
with built-in digital cameras. (NTT DoCoMo Press releases, 1999-2002). In the 
aftermath of the initially failed targeting of corporate subscribers, which was 
successfully followed by subsequent marketing focus on young private users 
(Kodama, 2001), NTT DoCoMo has managed to improve the attractiveness of the I-
mode corporate wireless services to the corporate market, which is lucrative due to the 
high sign-up rates on single contracts, high and relatively data-intense usage, and lack 
of personal income constraints collectively leading to higher ARPUs relative to 
private users. In mid 2001, corporate users comprised 10% of NTT DoCoMo’s 
subscriber base putting the company in a market leader position. Innovative corporate 
services such as sales support systems with business reporting, product information 
and customer data, and mobile message boards have been marketed under the two 
brands ‘DoCoMo value’ and ‘Link to DoCoMo’ (USB Warburg, June 2000).  
 
Innovating C-mode 
 
In April 2002, C-mode, an entirely new concept in 
consumer services was launched in Japan. With 
cutting-edge computer software a traditional soft 
drink vending machine had been transformed into an 
information station and services terminal offering 
fun, excitement and entertainment. The Cmo 
intelligent vending machine was the result of a fast-
paced joint development effort by Coca-Cola, 
DoCoMo and Itouchu Corp, one of the leading 
Japanese trading houses. In September 2000, the 
three partners agreed to brainstorm for potential 
content for an ‘I-vending’ machine linking an 
overhauled Coca-Cola vending machines with I-mode 
mobile phones. The project aimed to reap synergies 
from convergence of Coca-Cola’s expertise in 
vending commerce, DoCoMo’s wireless technologies 
and market knowledge, and Itouchu’s marketing 
expertise in products as diverse as information 
technologies, finance, textiles, construction, chemicals, real estate, aerospace, 
machinery, energy and food products. Coca-Colas nationwide network of around 1 
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million vending machines points to the attractiveness of this new form of distribution 
channel for DoCoMo services.  
 
As soon as March 2001, the three companies had developed a new business concept. 
In practice, having signed up as Cmode club member on the i-mode menu site “Coca-
Cola Moment”, the I-mode subscriber would access the vending machine via the 
infrared port of the handset, the i-vending machine then verifies the user's identity, 
after which the user can insert funds into any i-vending machine for subsequent 
cashless purchases. With a loaded I-mode phone, cashless shopping of soft drinks and 
a variety of services can be purchased with prepaid funds. Point service points are 
earned by making purchases on the I-vending machines, and these points can be 
exchanged for special merchandises including soft drinks or buying I-mode service 
content. 
 
Through commercial viability studies, the business concept was found mature for 
commercial testing to gauge consumer response and identify additional service 
options to extent the C-mode service later. From September to December 2001, 25 of 
the new Cmo prototype I-vending machine were installed at frequently visited spots in 
Tokyo (America’s Network, September 2001). The Cmo vending machines are highly 
computerized and their functionality can be enhanced according to consumer 
feedback. Trial users could while buying a coke purchase amusement park tickets, i-
mode content, local area guides and other types of information. 
 
Having extended the trial period into 2002, by April the three partners concluded that 
“Cmode to have high levels of consumer acceptance and to provide significant 
business opportunities” (NTT DoCoMo Press release, 15.04.2002). The now 41 
vending machines had attracted around 20.000 Club Cmode members that compared 
to regular vending machine users showed higher ratios of women and young people. 
A consumer survey gave the Cmode service high points of being “innovative,” “fun,” 
and “exciting”. Based on the trial period, the partners forecasted that Cmode would 
provide significant business opportunities. Coca-Cola achieved differentiation in the 
vending machine business and drink sales increased compared to regular vending 
machines. DoCoMo would increase I-mode usage by linking I-mode phones with the 
vending machines, and Itochu could expect an expansion of content business. 
 
In the launched version, in addition to traditional vending products, the Cmode offers 
local information such as maps, and advertising information such as coupons and 
Coca-Cola campaign and event information by checking the Cmo's built-in LCD 
display. A hardcopy printout or audio playback as well as amusement park tickets are 
also available from the machine’s speakers and printers (NTT DoCoMo Press 
releases). The Cmo machine also allows pay-per-download sales of i-mode content 
such as standby screen savers, wall-papers, ring-tone melodies, and i-αppli games. 
The roll-out of Cmos was planned at 2000 units across Japan by the end of 2002. 
Provided the flexible computerized technology platform of the Cmo, the three 
partners planned to form alliances with a wide range of new content providers to 
upgrade the range and depth of content provided by Cmode service.  
 
In the aftermath of Cmode development project, other I-mode services deploying 
infrared connections to other devices have been launched. The “Mobile GEO” service 
uses I-mode handsets as membership card and payment means in videoshops, 
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“iLawson” allows the user to collect coupons for later payment at convenience stores, 
and “Dam” turns the handset into a remote control for karaoke-systems allowing the 
user to request songs, play a stored playlist, and access lists of new releases (NTT 
DoCoMo, January 2003). 
 
Innovating Telematics 
services 
 
The Cmode service is a clear 
example of the convergence 
between wireless 
telecommunication and 
previously unrelated 
industries. DoCoMo 
approaches the challenge to 
develop new killer applications 
with partnerships to leverage 
own and partner technologies 
and market knowledge. 
Telematics (i.e. car multimedia 
services) is another prominent 
example that many observers expect has only seen its beginning with existing GPS 
location services. Telematics has long been touted as the next big blockbuster for the 
auto industry. Adventis, a technology consultancy, projects telematics to become a 
$20-billion industry in eight years. But so far, rather than filling the industry's coffers, 
telematics that is a wide array of computer-based services and functions including 
wireless communications, entertainment, safety/security, and vehicle diagnostics has 
been a steady money loser (Automotive Design & Production, July 2002). 
 
In February 2002, DoCoMo and Nissan agreed to jointly study the possibilities of a 
wide range of potential telematics services, and to develop onboard devices and an 
information platform building on FOMA technologies, and information services for 
driver/passengers and services utilizing vehicle information to be proliferated as 
industry standards used by many market participants. Nissan would contribute with its 
vehicle and human-machine interface (HMI) technologies, along with its expertise in 
information services for automotive applications accumulated through its current 
telematics service operations. DoCoMo, on its part, brings its mobile communication 
infrastructure and technologies as well as its expertise in mobile multimedia services 
(NTT DoCoMo Press releases).  
 
Swiftly, two service development targets were agreed, namely (1) advanced 
telematics services to be launched in early 2003, and (2) telematics services integrated 
with new media and other content industries to be launched in early 2004. For the first 
target, a brainstorm produced network navigation services with traffic information, 
weather reports, availability of parking, hotels, restaurants and other facilities linked 
to the latest road map data. Also, location-linked services were suggested as advanced 
telematics services to combine local information matching the users’ interests and 
preferences as voice and data.  
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The second service category was decided to focus on convergence with a range of 
other industries related to the everyday use of vehicle such as non-life insurance 
companies, security service companies, and service stations. Thereby, vehicle security 
could be improved and new possibilities for customer relationship management 
(CRM) would be created. Also, service integration with banking through e-money and 
broadcasting were considered. One example is on-demand audio-visual services that 
are combined with music downloads and the downloading of real-time information. 
 
By December 2002, out of the wide range of potential telematics service candidates, 
the partners formed a cross-industry group to develop business models targeting the 
car leasing companies. The group comprise from the car leasing, insurance, 
maintenance, components and other automobile-related industries. The group was 
commissioned to decide on types of relevant information, and begin transmission tests 
in January 2003. The development was expected to materialize into specific 
telematics services around April for commercial launch during 2003. The group 
should also facilitate dialog among the different industry groups to devise win-win 
business models for telematics services to deal with issues such as revenue sharing, 
R&D cost sharing, and IPR issues (NTT DoCoMo Press release; NTT DoCoMo, 
January 2003). 
 
Facing new relational challenges 
 
In rapidly changing and high-technology industries such as the wireless 
telecommunications, firms are increasingly resorting to strategic alliances for R&D, 
production and marketing activities. The need for rapid, flexible and innovative R&D, 
along with the global dispersion of technological competencies are key drivers of such 
alliances. Shaped by the traditional Japanese keiretsu industry model, interfirm 
collaboration has long been key to DoCoMo’s competitive strategy. In practice, the 
company engages in alliances in these core activities; (1) co-development of wireless 
handsets and network infrastructure, (2) co-development of new wireless service 
applications with e.g. IT, media, entertainment, corporate solutions and automotive 
companies, (3) technology standardization forums to proliferate DoCoMo’s 
proprietary technologies as global standards, (4) content provider alliances with nearly 
3000 official and above 55000 unofficial providers of Internet content to the I-mode 
service, and (5) market entry alliances with leading Asian, European and US operators 
to spread DoCoMo’s technologies and services globally. While the alliance strategy 
has greatly contributed to the success of DoCoMo, numerous critical challenges face a 
networked company. 
 
Looking back, Keiji Tachikawa, recognized the strong heritance for interfirm 
collaboration from parent NTT that was setup in postwar Japan to spur the 
development of a competitive electronics industry; an objective that was evoked 
through keiretsu-style collaboration on joint technology and product development 
within the NTT Family, and high dependency of family members on NTT’s enormous 
R&D and procurement budgets (Anchordoguy, 2001). Surely, the alliance strategy 
had been core to company successes such as I-mode, WCDMA development, handset 
portfolio and a strong brand. Following the deregulation of the Japanese market and 
the internationalization of DoCoMo, though, new challenges were piling up for the 
old alliance strategy, as partners were increasingly international and DoCoMo 
assumed a less dominant role vis-à-vis partners.  
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Technology standardization alliancing 
 
One alliance challenge confers to the ever-intensifying global standardization race 
over core wireless technologies, in which DoCoMo fundamentally changed approach 
during the 1990s. In Japan, wireless operators’ services have traditionally been 
incompatible and are operated on incompatible proprietary systems (Economist, 
October 2001). Provided its historic technological leadership, DoCoMo developed its 
own proprietary 2G standard (PDC). While the technology became superior as 
compromising standardization processes, negotiations and coordination did not 
hamper innovation, overseas network and handset vendors, as well as operators 
rejected PDC due to the implied dependency on DoCoMo. Instead, GSM pioneered 
by Nokia and Ericsson emerged as global 2G standard due its successful selection in 
Europe’s open standard setting committee (ETSI) with representatives from wireless 
operators, governments and equipment manufactures. Realizing it was in no position 
to dictate global standards, after 1996 DoCoMo actively formed alliances with 
overseas operators and equipment vendors to co-develop, proliferate and ensure 
overseas adaptation of its own 3G standard WCDMA (Funk and Methe, 2001; NTT 
DoCoMo Press release, 03.04.1997). Thereby, experience from acting as technology 
leader in Japan was leveraged (Ratliff, 2002). Crucially, DoCoMo formed a coalition 
with mainly Nokia and Ericsson, gave the partners the concession to integrate their 
core technology GSM into WCDMA, and won ETSI’s approval as the single 
European 3G standard (UMTS) in late 1997 in competition with a less aggressive US 
coalition proliferating their TDMA-based IS95 standard (Funk and Methe, 2001; 
Nomura, 1998). Due to the apparent success of DoCoMo’s strategy, WCDMA is now 
backed by most European mobile operators and equipment vendors, and adding to the 
standard’s critical mass, globally 115 operators subscribe to WCDMA (NTT 
DoCoMo Press release, 06.11.2002; Reuters, 20.12.2002). Recently, however, 
technical problems related to the rollout of WCDMA networks, high investments 
costs, as well as KDDI’s 3G lead in Japan based on its cdm2000 network, FOMA’s 
slow uptake and general uncertainty over which applications will attract consumers 
and justify the investments, have led several (often indebted) operators to put 
WCDMA investments on stand-by. Concurrently, cdma2000 1x and the future EVO 
update enabling 2,4 Mbps transmission is expanding its base with currently 15 
operators and 20 million users globally (Telephony, June 2002, Business Week, June 
2002; Reuters, 20.12.2002). Moreover, whereas the WCDMA standard requires 
rollout of new expensive networks, CDMA2000 1x requires only requires software 
upgrades to base stations of existing 2G cdma networks and new cards for handsets. 
This heavily impacts investment costs, the speed of rolling out, the breath of initial 
geographical coverage and, thus, enables more rapid commercial service launches. 
Clearly, Keiji Tachikawa was concerned about the toughening 3G standard race, but 
additionally the growing success of cdma2000 based 3G could jeopardize DoCoMo’s 
global plans for 4G telecommunications. In April 1998, the firm’s 4G R&D 
programme was launched, and by October 2002 DoCoMo’s proprietary OFDMA 
technology was chosen the company’s 4G standard. The technology enables 
100Mbps-downlink and 20Mbps-uplink transmissions (NTT DoCoMo Press release, 
18.03.2002; NTT DoCoMo Press release, 09.10.2002). The R&D has focused on high 
compatibility with WCDMA providing low migration costs for the expected large 
future base of WCDMA 3G networks. Thus, DoCoMo seeks lock-in of operators to its 
technologies with high future pay-offs to the currently expensive WCDMA network 
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rollouts (Nakajima and Yamao, 2001). In addition to the current success of cdma2000, 
US players including Qualcomm may have learned from 2G and 3G, and may better 
proliferate their 4G technologies. Clearly, standardization races will challenge 
DoCoMo again. 
 
Co-specialization and dependency on handset providers 
 
DoCoMo not only retails handsets vendors’ products, but also 
takes active part in co-developing new attractive phones. In 
contrast, in EU and US handset producers develop their own 
phones that in terms of availability and supported features 
subsequently set the boundaries for wireless operators’ 
competitive offerings of wireless services (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, January 2001; Reuters, 03.07.2001). The operator-
specificity of wireless services and handsets in Japan has fuelled 
a strong tradition for exclusive agreements between operators and 
vendors with long-lasting stable relationships as an obvious 
outcome (Nomura, 1998). Through joint R&D, DoCoMo and 
their handset vendors reap benefits from their co-specialized 
complementary technological and market capabilities. Based on 
experiences, Keiji Tachikawa had stated that handset vendors 
lack the “intimate understanding of user needs” and thus, 
DoCoMo must influence handset design to drive acceptance, 
usage and revenues and for this own R&D is critical (Boston 
Consulting Group, 2002). From his perspective European and US 
handset vendors such as Nokia, Ericsson and Motorola had too 
much power to dictate handset design. DoCoMo’s division of 
labor with vendors involves joint R&D until finalized prototypes 
and sufficient technical specifications are at hand. Then vendors 
produce the new models, and DoCoMo distributes and retails 
them through its vast nationwide sales network of DoCoMo stores. 
 
Until recently, DoCoMo primarily sourced from traditional NTT Family vendor, in 
particular NEC and Panasonic that still by 2001 supplied above 90% of I-mode 
handsets. The dependency was mutual as I-mode handsets represented 90% of NEC’s 
total handset sales (Far Eastern Economic Review, January 2001). The alliance model 
proved highly successful as e.g. DoCoMo offered superior handsets throughout the 
1990s and a key success factor for I-mode has been the ease of use built into the 
handsets. This illustrates the strong systemic dependencies between wireless services 
and handsets when exclusively bundled as a wireless package. The operator-specific 
handsets are grouped into model series with similar specifications, and within each 
series several handset manufactures supply their own version. The manufacturer is 
only recognizable from a letter in the model classification on the otherwise DoCoMo 
branded and operator-specific handsets. 
 
In recent years, the handset alliances had exploded in numbers from the cosy NTT 
family with particularly NEC and Fujitsu from ‘the big four’. In 2000, there were only 
four I-mode handset providers, namely NEC, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi and Panasonic 
(Communications International, April 2000). By now, I-mode handset suppliers are 
Denso (D), Ericsson (E), Kokusai (K), NEC (N), Nokia (NM), Panasonic (P), Sony 
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(SO), and Sharp (SH). For DoCoMo’s 3G service FOMA, 11 handset manufactures 
were commissioned, but by the launch in October 2001 only NEC and Panasonic were 
able to supply FOMA handsets. In 2002, Fujitsu (F) and Denso have also introduced 
FOMA-handsets, but world leaders such as Nokia and Ericsson still fall short of 
delivery (NTT DoCoMo Press releases, Telephony, May 2001). CEO Keiji 
Tachikawa thought of how the increasing number of suppliers required careful 
coordination and prioritization of R&D activities. Also, relationships with the 
numerous overseas vendors were quite different from the NTT Family not only for 
cultural reason, but they also less dependent on DoCoMo’s large R&D budgets, 
technological expertise and market leadership, since Japan was only one of their key 
markets. Change was also coming from within, as key suppliers such as NEC now 
explored overseas markets. Keiji Tachikawa was puzzled if the cozy relationships 
from Japan could be exported overseas as well, or whether old partners would go it 
alone or find new partners. On one side, NEC and Panasonic were key suppliers of I-
mode phones in the new European markets such as Germany, Netherlands and France. 
On the other side, for instance Panasonic had publicly announced that they would 
pursue all attractive internationalization avenues including marketing products under 
their own brands to move away from exclusivity agreements with DoCoMo (Far 
Eastern Economic Review, January 2001; InfoWorld, July 2000). Keiji Tachikawa 
saw the risk of leaking even proprietary knowledge benefiting overseas vendors and 
operators outside DoCoMo’s control. Thus, challenges of protecting intellectual 
property rights were emerging.  
 
The intensified competition from domestic competitors J-Phone and KDDI that too 
have exclusivity agreements with handset vendors had challenged the supremacy of 
the ‘DoCoMo’ family’s handsets. For instance, with its competitive photoemail 
service enabled by attractive handset with built-in cameras, J-Phone rather than 
DoCoMo had reaped first mover advantages in this killer app. J-Phone launched 
camera-handsets in November 2000, and the Sha-Mail service followed in June 2001. 
DoCoMo had entered the photoemail segment in June 2002 with less appealing 
handsets. Similarly, KDDI and its handset vendors have pioneered GPS-enabled 
handsets and services. Now, Keiji Tachikawa was hoping that the major overhaul of I-
mode and FOMA handsets in 2002 and DoCoMo’s latest initiative to fund half of 
vendors’ R&D in FOMA handsets would help the company and its partners regain its 
leadership (Financial Times, January 2003b). 
 
International alliance endeavors 
 
Spurred by the internationalization intent laid down in the Vision 2010 strategy, 
DoCoMo entered the global battle for wireless supremacy through a massive 
investment spree of accumulated Y1,8bn in 2000 and 2001. Equity stakes of 15-20% 
were acquired in key partners such as Dutch KPN Mobile, Taiwanese KG Telecom, 
and US AT&T Wireless that should serve as bridgeheads into the European, US and 
Asian markets (NTT DoCoMo Press releases). DoCoMo allied primarily with former 
state monopolies “with similar cultures including respect for R&D and conservative 
management styles” (Ratliff, 2002:67). At this time, DoCoMo was a highly attractive 
partner with its technological lead in 3G technologies chosen as EU’s UMTS standard 
(WCDMA), strong R&D organization, essential patents, the proven wireless Internet 
model and technology platform and highly successful I-mode service, strong R&D 
and core technologies, dominance in the EU UMTS standard WCDMA, as well as 
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substantial financial resources to co-finance the expensive acquisitions of 3G licenses 
and rollouts of novel WCDMA networks (Business Week, August 2000; Fortune, 
September 2000). In return, the equity-stakes gave cost-efficient access to overseas 
partners’ local market knowledge, existing wireless network infrastructure such as a 
GPRS networks, their ties with handset and equipment vendors necessary for the 
network rollout, local brands and the existing subscriber base. Partnerships were vital 
considering the limited international experience of DoCoMo at the turn of the 
millennium.  
 
Initially, the market alliances focused solely on bidding of 3G licenses and subsequent 
role out of WCDMA networks as part of DoCoMo’s proliferation of its core 3G 
technology as de facto world standard, and thereby profit from its technological and 
market lead in advanced wireless services. During 2001, DoCoMo successfully 
shifted the short-term focus of the alliances to rapid rollout of 2G I-mode services on 
GPRS networks upgraded from GSM. This to fill a widening revenue gab caused by 
saturated I-mode uptake, intensified competition and slower than expected acceptance 
of the new 3G FOMA service. Having developed an I-mode overlay for GPRS, I-
mode services were launched in numerous Asian, European and US markets during 
2002 (see chart). 
 
The export of DoCoMo’s success has proven far from easy. In addition to technical 
problems with incompatible systems and heavy investment requirements, I-mode 
services have had limited commercial success. By December 2002, I-mode had about 
220.000 subscribers in Germany and Netherlands, and almost 100.000 in France 
(Wall Street Journal, February 2003). The problems reassured sceptic European and 
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US operators and equipment manufactures that DoCoMo’s success was a Japanese 
phenomenon due to (1) low competition from PCs and fix-lines due to high costs of 
dial-up Internet access, small PC penetration, and high costs of fix line telephoning, 
(2) cultural and demographic factors such as the large population proportion of 
teenagers and young adults being gadget-freaks and customer taste differences 
making many information services (i.e. entertainment, fortune telling, ringing tone 
download and kitty cartoons) only popular in Japan due to culture, and (3) NTT 
DoCoMo’s dominant position in an isolated market enabling it to dictate wireless 
offerings and developments. Moreover, the market conditions in EU and US have 
been argued to be less lucrative for wireless data services, because (1) users would 
have little interest in I-mode like Internet services because Internet content largely is 
free (consumers only pay for the internet access when using PC, although this is 
changing), and (2) Europe is short of a legacy of millions of wireless data subscribers 
due to the failures of WAP and GPRS to date (Communications International, 
February 2002; Economist, March 2002; Telecommunications International, February 
2001). Keiji Tachikawa recalled how unhappy shareholders at a meeting in June 2002 
had lashed out at DoCoMo for the souring overseas investments and the 
management’s commitment to continue despite huge write-offs of overseas 
sharepositions (Y1,490bn out of Y1,8bn). Vice president Yoshinori Uda had defended 
the expansive global strategy arguing that  
 
"It's necessary to make overseas investments to cope with the globalization of the 
mobile phone market […] and we will continue investments otherwise we won't be 
able to survive and may miss a growth opportunity" (Reuters, 20.06.2002).   
 
While sticking to the investment strategy and facing exportability problems, Keiji 
Tachikawa asked himself, if his company had forgotten a key lesson from the 
successful development of a wireless market in Japan and the creation of the world’s 
largest wireless Internet. They had carefully adapted technologies and services to 
consumer preferences through user-driven innovation. Could one explanation behind 
the slow overseas uptake be lacking adaptation of existing services from Japan and/or 
lacking development of novel wireless services matching unique market 
characteristics of overseas markets. 
 
Recently, other severe challenges to the internationalization strategy had emerged that 
shareholders would soon point to. In US, worsening market conditions lead to a 
plunge of partner AT&T’s shares, and annual wireless subscriber growth has dropped 
from 40% to 20%. AT&T’s trouble fed concerns that it would fall short of launching 
3G services in 14 of the top 50 markets in the US by June 2004. While DoCoMo had 
a clause with a right to sell back its 16% stake to AT&T, if the target was not fulfilled, 
there was a risk that AT&T would spread the service to provincial cities to avoid the 
right being exercised. Instead, in the light of limited control of partner activities in 
minority alliances, DoCoMo and AT&T agreed to change the ambition to agreed to 
start 3G services in 4 major cities - San Francisco, Seattle, Dallas and San Diego - by 
the end of 2004 instead (Financial Times, January 2003a). In Europe, apart from slow 
commercialization, DoCoMo’s bet on Dutch KPN Mobile with its Belgium, German 
and East European subsidiaries as its key European partner was also backfiring. In 
near future, Keiji Tachikawa expected a consolidation of the European market leading 
to 4 dominant players. Already now it was clear that KPN would not be among those; 
only global competitor Vodaphone is in that league by now. Therefore, DoCoMo led 
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its equity stake in KPN deplete from 15% to 2,2%, and consider to expand existing 
friendly relationships with Italian TIM and/or Spanish Telefonica. However, 
shareholders had to be convinced for such a move (Financial Times, December 2002; 
Financial Times, January 2003a). 
 
Managing growth 
 
 
 
Looking back, Keiji Tachikawa remembered the thrilling days of 100%+ growth rates 
in the mid-1990s. DoCoMo’s growth strategy then rested upon traditional means such 
as clever branding, low tariffs, a proprietary network, and high quality handsets and 
wireless voice services. While I-mode had paved the road for new wireless data 
service to substitute falling ARPUs from traditional voice services, the wireless 
Internet was showing signs of saturation and for future growth, new compelling 
innovations had become essential. DoCoMo’s growth strategy laid down in Vision 
2010 had formulated three key growth pillars for DoCoMo; (1) Multimedia enabled 
by new service applications such as multimedia messaging, (2) Globalization through 
alliances with overseas operators, and (3) Ubiquitous services (see figure) (NTT 
DoCoMo Annual report 2001; NTT DoCoMo, January 2003).  
 
Much progress was already on its way for future multimedia services. In the quest to 
find utilization of the higher capacity of 3G technologies, convergence with the media 
industry had been a fairly obvious path, as videos, music, pictures, games and more 
content types were already digitized, available on the Internet and mobile devices 
related to each were already existing. Since, late 1999, Keiji Tachikawa had taken 
DoCoMo abroad through minority stake alliances, and thereby reached most key 
overseas markets rapidly and efficiently. Having publicly defended the 
internationalization strategy at numerous occasions, Keiji Tachikawa was sure 
DoCoMo was on the right track with respect to this growth pillar. Thus, in the light of 
the currently slow uptake of FOMA multimedia services (pillar 1) and shareholders’ 
scientism about the internationalization strategy (pillar 2), taking shareholders on a 
visionary journey to 2010 with a focus ubiquitous services appealed highly to 
Tachikawa. With these services DoCoMo sought to meet user needs beyond person-
to-person communication to machine-to-machine and person-to-machine 
communication, as well as tailoring services to particular needs of different industries 
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or individual users (NTT DoCoMo Press Kit, 2001). Thereby, DoCoMo can exceed 
exceeding 100% penetration (Economist, October 1999). 
 
Substantial innovation efforts were required in 
this field, and most service application 
alliances to date had been formed with leading 
media players. Still, the vision remained that 
70-80% of traffic would be generated by 
wireless data services, and DoCoMo had 
previously predicted that by 2010 only a third 
of units delivering wireless services would be 
handsets (see table). An early success has been 
the I-vending machine Cmo co-developed with 
Coca-Cola and a Japanese trading firm. Now, 
also other infrared communication enabled services are planned such as Mobile GEO, 
iLawson, and clubDAM.com. The DoCo-desu-Car location service enabled by GPS 
allows firms to locate trucks and goods. In collaboration with Nissan, advanced 
telematics are under development. Also, the m-payment service e-value allows online 
purchase of subway tickets, drinks and tickets for events and concerts, and the e-
billing payment services lets users pay for groceries in convenience stores with 
handset (NTT DoCoMo January 2003). 
 
A more short-term project has been the launch of M-Stage MMS services for PDAs 
connected via 2G PDC handsets. Thereby, DoCoMo leverages the vast existing 
number of PDAs and I-mode phones to deliver advanced FOMA services at a time 
when FOMA attracts only few subscribers. In February 2002, the PDA portal 
‘Infogate’ was launched and from October 2002, three M-stage services were 
launched (Visual Net, M-Stage book, and M-Stage V-live) (NTT DoCoMo Press 
releases). 
 
The Nissan alliance and the telematics services under development had taught a few 
early lessons. Joint R&D was extremely challenging as participants were from 
completely unrelated industries. DoCoMo that was used to providing leading-edge 
user knowledge also found itself in a new role as technology provider with limited 
understanding of the new customers. Also, DoCoMo’s R&D organization including 
existing handset and network partners had found itself in an entirely new territory. 
Thus, while ubiquitous services were compelling, such diversification would surely be 
questioned by the already skeptic shareholders.  
 
As the private jet landed in Tokyo, Keiji Tachikawa was wondering if his company 
had overlooked attractive ubiquitous applications for wireless technology for the 
future, or for that sake new promising pillars for the growth strategy. Surely, the 
presentation of the financial year 2003 ending on 31 March 2003 would require his 
full attention in the near future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vision 2010 
People (handsets) 120 mill
Cars 100 mill
Bicycles 60 mill
Portable PCs 50 mill
Motorbikes, boats, 
vending machines etc 
10 mill
Pets (e.g. cats, dogs) 20 mill
Total 360 mill
NTT DoCoMo, September 2001 
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DoCoMo APRU
(FY1995=March95) 1995/3 1996/3 1997/3 1998/3 1999/3 2000/3 1Q/01 2Q/01 3Q/01 2002/3 1Q/02 2Q/02 3Q/02
PDC APRU total 19720 15930 12570 10800 9270 8740 8770 8570 8540 8020 8150 8170 8200
  - Voice APRU 8620 7300 7060 6960 6430 6520 6460 6430
  - I-mode APRU 120 1470 1510 1580 1590 1630 1710 1770
FOMA APRU total - - 10400 8430 7800 7250 7750
Total I-mode APRU 2300 2180 2130 2040 2040 2100 2110
KDDI ARPU
(FY1995=March95) 1995/3 1996/3 1997/3 1998/3 1999/3 2000/3 1Q/01 2Q/01 3Q/01 2002/3 1Q/02 2Q/02 3Q/02
Au Total ARPU 8610 8360 8060 7320 7560 7660 7640
- Au Voice 7760 7470 7180 6390 6530 6530 6440
- Au Data 850 890 880 930 1030 1130 1200
Au CDMA 2000 1x subtotal 10420 9610 9240
- Au 3G Voice 7290 7310 7080
- Au 3G Data 3130 2300 2160
APPENDIX 
 
NTT DoCoMo consolidated financial figures, 1995-2002 
Million yen 
Financial year* 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Operating revenues 806.982 1.237.176 1.962.850 2.626.120 3.118.398 3.718.694 4.669.366 5.171.500
Net Income 16.448 21.379 28.690 120.628 204.815 252.140 401.755 800
Total Assets 959.483 1.228.840 1.799.036 2.293.723 3.331.137 3.613.124 6.016.505 5.912.500
Employees 5.945 6.323 6.901 7.557 9.342 10.098  18.015 19.700
* The financial year is from April 1 to March 31 (i.e. FY02 ended 31.03.2002) 
Sources: NTT DoCoMo Annual Reports 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002. 
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OUTLOOK – Service and handset roadmaps. 
 
 
KDDI, February 2003  
Total wireless market subscribers (000), March each year
1991/3 1992/3 1993/3 1994/3 1995/3 1996/3 1997/3 1998/3 1999/3 2000/3 2001/3 2002/3 dec-02 jan-03
Total market 868 1378 1712 2131 4331 10204 20876 31526 41530 51141 60943 69121 73514 73900
DoCoMo 549 846 1027 1323 2206 4936 10960 17984 23898 29356 36026 40783 42874 43033
KDDI (consolidated) 806 1844 4095 5553 9420 11453 13619 14940 16105 17317 17411
au (KDDI) 10986 12214 13468 13583
Tu-ka (KDDI) 259 1005 1899 2323 2890 3494 3954 3891 3849 3828
J-Phone (consolidated) 281 1173 2873 4123 6179 8166 9978 12232 13323 13456
IDO Corp 335 635 1130 1722 2768 3265 3895
DDI Cellular 471 950 1960 1932 4329 5298 6230
Digital Phone 281 1080 1913 2373 3906
Digital Tu-ka 93 960 1750 2273
Wireless market shares
1991/3 1992/3 1993/3 1994/3 1995/3 1996/3 1997/3 1998/3 1999/3 2000/3 2001/3 2002/3 dec-02 jan-03
DoCoMo 63,2 61,4 60 62,1 50,9 48,4 52,5 57 57,5 57,4 59,1 59 59,5 59,5
DCM cal 63,2% 61,4% 60,0% 62,1% 50,9% 48,4% 52,5% 57,0% 57,5% 57,4% 59,1% 59,0% 58,3% 58,2%
KDDI (consolidated) 38% 43% 40% 27% 30% 28% 27% 25% 23% 23,6% 23,6%
au (KDDI) 18% 18% 18,3% 18,4%
Tu-ka (KDDI) 6% 10% 9% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5,2% 5,2%
J-Phone (consolidated) 6% 11% 14% 13% 15% 16% 16% 18% 18,1% 18,2%
IDO Corp 16% 15% 11% 8% 9% 8% 8%
DDI Cellular 22% 22% 19% 9% 14% 13% 12%
Digital Phone 6% 11% 9% 8% 9%
Digital Tu-ka 1% 5% 6% 5%
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Brew = service application platform standard for cdma2000 1x, corporate solutions, 
GPS and current services combined. 
SI = system integrators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NTT DoCoMo, January 2003) 
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